By Arfang Madi Sillah, Washington DC
National security has emerged as a paramount focus in the contemporary geopolitical arena, with nation-states around the world recalibrating their strategic priorities to address an increasingly complex array of threats. In an era characterized by the proliferation of non-state actors, cyber warfare, transnational crime, and hybrid threats, the significance of resilient and adaptive national security framework cannot be overstated. These strategies are not merely supplementary to statecraft but are the linchpin around which a state’s sovereignty, political stability, and economic viability revolve. Scholars like Barry Buzan have long emphasized that national security extends beyond the conventional defense paradigms, encompassing the protection of societal values, economic stability, and institutional integrity. Buzan’s seminal work, “People, States, and Fear” (1991), delineates how national security functions as both a protective and a projective mechanism within the international system, enabling states to safeguard against internal disintegration while projecting power and influence externally.
In its advanced conceptualization, national security transcends the traditional confines of military defense. It encompasses a comprehensive spectrum of state apparatuses, including law enforcement, intelligence operations, cyber defenses, border control, and strategic diplomacy. These components must operate in a synergistic manner to ensure the state’s capability to counter multifaceted threats—both external and internal—that could compromise its sovereignty and destabilize its socio-political fabric. The indicators of a robust national security architecture include a highly trained and technologically advanced military, efficient and transparent law enforcement, political cohesion, economic resilience, and a proficient foreign policy framework. The absence or weakening of any of these elements can precipitate a cascade of vulnerabilities, potentially leading to state failure. As Frederick S. Lane argues in “Current Issues in Public Administration” (1994), the efficacy of national security is predicated on the seamless coordination of state institutions and the strategic alignment of security policies with the overarching national interest.
Unfortunately, in the Gambia, the exigency to fortify national security has been accentuated by systemic deficiencies within the administration of President Adama Barrow. Upon assuming office, President Barrow inherited a security sector marred by inefficiencies, entrenched corruption, and a notorious legacy of human rights violations perpetuated by the previous regime. The Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiative, heralded as a cornerstone of Barrow’s strategic governance blueprint was intended to recalibrate the security forces into a professional, accountable, and modernized entity. However, the implementation trajectory of the SSR has been beset by inertia, revealing significant flaws in the administration’s strategic approach to national security. In essence, The Gambia’s security agencies are dysfunctional and unfit for purpose—a condition directly attributable to deficiencies in leadership and the profoundly flawed security and defense policies under President Barrow’s administration. These policies, characterized by superficial reforms rather than substantive institutional overhauls, have left the country’s security architecture in a state of disrepair.
Security expert Mark Sedra, in his analysis of SSR in post-conflict states, argues that the failure to implement comprehensive reforms creates a security vacuum that non-state actors are quick to exploit. The Barrow administration’s inability to effectively overhaul the security sector not only exacerbates existing vulnerabilities but also raises the specter of state capture by entrenched elites—a dynamic extensively explored in political science literature by Francis Fukuyama in “State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century” (2004). Sedra’s insights, particularly from his work at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), underscore the critical need for robust institutional frameworks that can withstand the pressures of internal power struggles and external threats.
One of the most acute issues undermining The Gambia’s national security framework is its disproportionate reliance on foreign military contingents, specifically the Economic Community of West African States Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG). While ECOMIG’s initial deployment was instrumental in stabilizing the nation during the tumultuous transition from Yahya Jammeh’s autocratic rule, the continued dependency on these external forces has underscored The Gambia’s incapacity to autonomously secure its national interests. This dependency is not only a symptom of the state’s weakened military capabilities but also a significant detriment to its sovereign integrity. Furthermore, the recurring incursions by Senegalese forces into Gambian territory, ostensibly to pursue Casamance separatists, or even common criminals have starkly exposed the deficiencies in The Gambia’s border security and territorial sovereignty. Such extraterritorial violations, which include extrajudicial operations and the circumvention of Gambian authority, are indicative of a broader failure in the Barrow administration’s ability to assert control over its national boundaries and adhere to the principles of international law. Kenneth Waltz’s theory of structural realism, as articulated in “Theory of International Politics” (1979), posits that reliance on foreign military forces often triggers a security dilemma, where the state’s perceived vulnerability precipitates further external interventions, thereby eroding its autonomous strategic posture. This dynamic is further compounded by the Barrow administration’s lackluster diplomatic efforts in managing ‘win-win bilateral relations’ with Senegal—a crucial aspect of national security that demands sophisticated diplomatic insight and strategic foresight. The theoretical frameworks advanced by Stephen Krasner in “Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy” (1999) are particularly relevant here, as they elucidate the complexities faced by states that struggle to maintain their sovereignty in the face of external dependencies and internal governance challenges.
With a population comparable in size to that of Texas, the Gambia is home to seven state security agencies: the Gambia Armed Forces (GAF), the Gambia Police Force (GPF), the State Intelligence Service (SIS), the Gambia Immigration Department, the Gambia Fire and Rescue Services, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG), and the Gambia Prison Service. However, these agencies have proven largely dysfunctional, plagued by poor training, inadequate equipment, and rampant corruption. These systemic issues are deeply rooted in the historical legacies of the past regimes of Presidents Jawara and Jammeh, which have left a lingering impact on the structural and operational integrity of the country’s security apparatus. Internally, The Gambia’s security apparatus remains beset by profound institutional deficiencies that have critically undermined the effectiveness of its law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Below is an in-depth analysis of each agency, accompanied by an evaluation of the service chiefs’ performance in office, as well as additional relevant insights.
Gambia Armed Forces(GAF)
The Gambia Armed Forces (GAF) presents a complex profile characterized by both notable successes and conspicuous failures. On the international stage, the GAF has played a significant role in regional security, particularly through its involvement in peacekeeping missions across Africa. This includes commendable participation in the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), where Gambian soldiers significantly contributed to protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid, and supporting peace processes in a conflict-ridden region.
The GAF has also been an integral part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), deploying troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone during their civil wars. Their role in enforcing ceasefires, supporting democratic governance, and protecting civilians from war atrocities has earned them respect and recognition.
Furthermore, the GAF contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), aiming to stabilize the country, reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab, and support the Somali government in establishing control over its territory. These engagements have not only highlighted the operational competence of the GAF but have also bolstered its reputation as a committed partner in regional stability.
Despite these commendable achievements, the GAF faces severe internal challenges that compromise its current effectiveness. The military’s historical focus on regime security, particularly during the authoritarian rule of former President Yahya Jammeh, has left it inadequately prepared to address contemporary national defense challenges. The GAF’s inability to modernize its military doctrines and equipment has resulted in a force ill-equipped to handle external threats such as cross-border incursions or potential terrorist activities. According to Mahnken (2008), continuous adaptation and modernization are crucial for military forces to keep pace with evolving threats. The GAF’s failure to implement these practices renders it vulnerable to external aggression and undermines its ability to project power effectively in regional security dynamics.
Another significant issue is the lack of professional military education among GAF personnel. Unlike professional militaries, where advancing through the ranks typically requires a solid foundation in military science, strategy, and leadership, many GAF officers lack formal university education or attendance at military academies. This deficiency in education and training severely limits the GAF’s strategic leadership capabilities. During Jammeh’s regime, the culture of favoritism, rather than meritocracy, exacerbated this problem, with promotions often based on loyalty rather than competence. Consequently, the GAF’s leadership structure remains inadequately prepared for the demands of modern military command.
The absence of a coherent national defense strategy, combined with outdated military doctrines and equipment, renders the Gambia Armed Forces ineffective in their primary role of defending the nation’s sovereignty. Thomas G. Mahnken, a respected scholar in military strategy and the editor of “Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945” (2008), emphasizes the need for continuous adaptation and modernization within military forces to keep pace with evolving threats. The Gambia’s failure to modernize its military strategy and equipment leaves the country vulnerable to external aggression and undermines its ability to project power or influence in regional security dynamics.
The prolonged reliance on the ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) under President Adama Barrow’s administration has further sidelined the GAF from its traditional roles. This outsourcing of national security functions to ECOWIG has undermined the morale of Gambian soldiers, eroded public confidence in the GAF’s capability to defend the country independently, and challenged the recruitment and training of new personnel. While ECOMIG troops have performed admirably, their presence cannot substitute for a competent, homegrown security force. This reliance on foreign forces is a tacit admission of failure and highlights the inadequacy of local security institutions.
It is deeply ironic that the GAF, lauded for their role in peacekeeping missions across conflict-ridden regions like Sudan and Liberia, remain incapable of securing their own borders without the assistance of foreign troops. This contradiction evokes the dark humor of a strategic playbook where a nation, adept at projecting strength internationally, cannot muster the capability to address its internal security challenges. Despite their impressive international credentials, the GAF’s continued reliance on external forces underscores a sobering reality: a military force celebrated globally yet struggling with the most basic tenets of national defense.
Gambia Police Force(GPF)
The Gambia Police Force (GPF) is indeed a study in contradiction. On one hand, it often mirrors the Keystone Cops, the bumbling and incompetent police officers depicted in early 20th-century silent films like Keystone Kops (1912). These films highlighted the absurdity and inefficiency of a law enforcement agency that lacked coordination, competence, and effective leadership. Similarly, the GPF’s operational inefficiencies, outdated practices, and lack of modernization draw a negative correlation to this cinematic portrayal. The force’s inability to effectively keep pace with fast changing dynamics in the world of modern policing, coupled with its reliance on reactive rather than proactive policing strategies, paints a picture of an institution that is out of sync with the demands of contemporary law enforcement.
However, the GPF also represents a resilient organization striving to fulfill its mandate under challenging conditions. Despite chronic underfunding, inadequate training, and significant operational limitations, there are pockets within the force that exhibit a commendable level of dedication and commitment to public safety. This dichotomy reflects the complex reality of the GPF, where moments of competence and professionalism coexist with systemic shortcomings.
The GPF presents an intriguing contrast when compared with police departments in other parts of the world, particularly in the United States. In the U.S., law enforcement agencies have been reported to be involved in the fatal shootings of over 1,000 individuals annually, with issues of unlawful racial profiling and excessive use of force frequently making headlines. This troubling trend highlights a more militarized approach to policing, where officers are often quick to resort to firearms and other forms of lethal force.
In stark contrast, the GPF stands out for its restrained approach to law enforcement. In The Gambia, police officers rarely carry firearms, let alone use them, embodying the true definition of “peace officers.” The emphasis in Gambian policing is on maintaining peace and resolving conflicts without escalating to violence. This approach has fostered a policing culture that prioritizes de-escalation and community engagement over force. The GPF excels in addressing many issues that, in the Western context, might be handled with far more aggressive and often negative methods.
For instance, in The Gambia, the police typically do not involve themselves in family disputes unless the situation escalates to a level where intervention becomes necessary. This contrasts with practices in some Western countries where police might be called in at the first sign of conflict, sometimes leading to unnecessary escalation. Additionally, Gambian police officers are often more adept at handling social issues with a focus on mediation and conflict resolution. They operate with a community-oriented mindset, aiming to resolve issues peacefully and maintain public trust.
This approach reflects a broader commitment to human rights and the well-being of citizens. While the GPF faces numerous challenges, such as underfunding and inadequate resources, its positive impact on community relations is significant. The force’s restraint in the use of force and its focus on maintaining social harmony set a commendable example of policing that prioritizes the protection of life and the resolution of conflicts through dialogue and understanding. While the GPF may struggle with certain operational inefficiencies, it nevertheless embodies a model of policing that contrasts sharply with the more aggressive tactics seen in other parts of the world. By maintaining a focus on peacekeeping and community engagement, the GPF continues to play a vital role in upholding social stability in The Gambia.
But again, this is not to suggest that the GPF is fully fit for purpose. Indeed, there is still a great deal of growing up to do, as the GPF continues to resemble an institution that is more a work-in-progress than a finished product. To say that there’s room for improvement would be like saying that a sieve has potential as a water jug—technically true, but not exactly reassuring. The force remains entangled in the quagmire of archaic operational methodologies, pervasive corruption, and a culture of mediocrity that would make even the most patient of reformers despair.
The adoption of modern policing techniques, such as community policing, is often as superficial as a politician’s promise during an election year—grand in theory but lacking in substance. The force continues to lean heavily on reactive strategies, reminiscent of a fire brigade rushing to a blaze after the house has already burned down. This operational inertia is compounded by leadership that seems as committed to meaningful reform as a cat is to water.
As criminologist Herman Goldstein observed in Problem-Oriented Policing (1990), effective policing requires a shift from traditional, incident-driven responses to more strategic, problem-solving approaches that address the root causes of crime. Unfortunately, the GPF’s reluctance to embrace such changes leaves it woefully unprepared to deal with the complex security challenges of the 21st century.
With continued investment in comprehensive training, modernization of operational methodologies, and the promotion of proactive community engagement, the GPF could very well transform into a model of effective policing, setting a benchmark across Africa that would, by extension, make Robert Peel rise from his grave for a well-deserved round of applause. As the architect of the first modern police force in London in 1829, his principles—often summarized as “the police are the public, and the public are the police”—continue to shape law enforcement globally. His emphasis on crime prevention, public trust, and accountability has become the cornerstone of policing practices. Today, Peel’s ideas are reflected in community-oriented policing models, which stress the importance of building relationships between police and the communities they serve. Even as policing evolves with technology and new challenges, Peel’s legacy endures, reminding law enforcement agencies worldwide that their legitimacy and effectiveness hinge on public consent and cooperation. However, as with all institutional reforms, achieving this requires a commitment as steadfast as a statesman’s integrity—if such a virtue still exists.
State Intelligence Service (SIS)
The State Intelligence Service (SIS) plays a pivotal role in national security as a key component of strategic operations, responsible for safeguarding the state against various threats. Its core function involves not merely the collection of data, but the transformation of this raw information into actionable insights that inform policy decisions crucial for national security. Effective intelligence work demands the ability to convert gathered data into strategic guidance that supports national leaders in navigating an increasingly complex global environment.
Despite the rebranding from the notorious National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to the SIS, the agency has struggled to evolve into a modern intelligence organization capable of addressing both domestic and international security challenges. The SIS remains predominantly staffed by individuals whose education does not extend beyond high school, leaving them inadequately prepared for the sophisticated tasks of intelligence collection and analysis. The necessary theoretical knowledge, including an understanding of geopolitical trends and the application of advanced analytical frameworks, is largely absent among its personnel. Consequently, intelligence operations within The Gambia are rudimentary, often failing to provide the strategic insights needed to proactively address emerging threats.
Richard J. Aldrich, in his work “The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence” (2001), underscores the importance of employing highly educated and well-trained professionals in intelligence agencies. He argues that modern intelligence work requires individuals who are not only skilled in data collection but also adept at interpreting complex geopolitical dynamics and applying sophisticated analytical methods. The SIS’s current shortcomings in these areas highlight its challenges in adapting to contemporary security demands, underscoring the need for a comprehensive overhaul to enhance its effectiveness in protecting national interests.
The effectiveness of an intelligence agency like the SIS hinges significantly on the variety and sophistication of its intelligence collection methods. These methods include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), which involves gathering information through interpersonal contact such as recruiting informants, interviewing sources, and conducting covert operations. HUMINT is crucial for obtaining insights into the intentions, plans, and capabilities of hostile entities.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), on the other hand, involves intercepting communications such as phone calls, emails, and other electronic communications to provide valuable information on the activities of foreign governments, terrorist organizations, and other entities posing threats to national security.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) involves analyzing satellite images and other geospatial data to monitor activities and developments in specific geographic areas. This method is particularly useful for assessing military movements, infrastructure development, and environmental changes, offering a clear picture of geographic and spatial dynamics.
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) involves analyzing publicly available information such as news reports, social media, and academic publications. OSINT provides valuable context and background that complements other intelligence sources, offering a broad view of public sentiment and trends.
Finally, Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) focuses on detecting and analyzing physical emanations and signals across the electromagnetic spectrum. MASINT is essential for identifying and understanding technical signatures that reveal hidden or developing threats, such as the presence of nuclear materials, radar emissions, or other specialized signals.
Each of these intelligence collection methods plays a vital role in ensuring that the SIS can effectively monitor and counter threats to national security, providing a comprehensive and multifaceted understanding of both immediate and long-term challenges.
However, the SIS’s current reliance on traditional HUMINT methods underscores its limitations in adapting to modern intelligence requirements, as some of their agents end up blowing their own covers anyway.
In the shadowy world of spycraft, where secrecy is sacrosanct, the golden rule for any self-respecting spy is to remain utterly invisible. The primary job of a spy, as any James Bond aficionado would tell you, is to avoid detection at all costs. After all, when a spy’s cover is blown, it’s not just their neck on the line—it can bring shame to politicians, unravel carefully spun webs of deceit, and, horror of horrors, bring actual facts to light. But, as usual, The Gambia likes to do things its own special way.
The SIS seems to have a different take on the concept of espionage. In other words, within the SIS, keeping a low profile seems to be as outdated as the Nokia 3310. Call it reverse espionage or anything else, but spy operations under the SIS are about as stealthy as a marching band in a library. Most of The Gambia’s intelligence officers are practically household names, known to one and all as the nation’s very own espionage agents. It’s as if they’re handing out business cards at the local market: “Hi, I’m with the SIS. Ask me anything!”
No wonder they can’t distinguish between noise and signal; it’s like trying to find a needle in a haystack while blindfolded—and then setting the haystack on fire for good measure. Most technocrats see very little use in their contribution to shaping policy, as the SIS agents are about as efficient as a chocolate teapot. Their intelligence work is more like a sitcom than a spy thriller—less James Bond, more Inspector Clouseau, but without the charm. In a nutshell, the SIS doesn’t bother with those old-fashioned undercover ops; they’re more into public covert operations—if you can imagine such a thing. Forget slipping into the shadows; these agents prefer the spotlight. They operate like they’re starring in their own reality TV show, complete with fan meet-and-greets. Instead of blending in, they stand out, waving their SIS badges like they’re on a promotional tour. It’s less about gathering secrets and more about gathering attention. The art of espionage has never been so…public.
Gambia Immigration Department (GID)
The Gambia Immigration Department is another glaring example of an institution crippled by corruption, inefficiency, and bureaucratic inertia. The department is notorious for its inability to perform its most basic functions, such as issuing national documents like identity cards and passports, often taking months or even years to process applications. This inefficiency is exacerbated by the deeply entrenched culture of bribery, where officers routinely accept payments to expedite services or allow criminals to pass through border controls unchecked. The department’s leadership has consistently failed to implement meaningful reforms, despite numerous opportunities to modernize its operations.
Pa Musa Drammeh, a former director who held a degree in criminal justice from a U.S. university, briefly initiated reforms aimed at improving efficiency and accountability. However, his efforts were quickly thwarted, as it became apparent that the entrenched interests within the department preferred the status quo of corruption and inefficiency. Drammeh’s removal from his position underscores a broader issue within the department: the preference for corrupt officials over effective, reform-minded leaders. The result is an immigration service that is not only outdated and dysfunctional but also ethically compromised, with appointments and promotions often based on favoritism rather than merit. The failures of the Gambia Immigration Department are particularly stark when compared to modern border management standards, as outlined by John F. Dillman in “Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective” (2013). Dillman emphasizes the importance of technology, transparency, and rigorous training in building effective immigration services—elements that are glaringly absent in The Gambia’s approach to border control and national document issuance.
Given the department’s track record, the question isn’t whether it should be reformed but rather whether it should be disbanded or absorbed into another branch within the sector. Retaining the GID in its current form is like keeping a broken clock in the hope that it might someday tell the correct time. Its persistent inefficiency and corruption suggest that the only viable options are a radical overhaul or a complete dissolution. By transferring its functions to a more competent branch or integrating them into a newly established bureau within the security sector, The Gambia could create a streamlined system that serves its citizens efficiently and ethically.
Gambia Prison Services (GPS)
The Gambia Prison Services is another agency beset by operational failures that compromise the broader national security framework. The service is characterized by chronic overcrowding, inadequate facilities, and a failure to provide rehabilitative programs for inmates, all of which contribute to high recidivism rates and potential prison unrest. The inability to manage the prison population effectively reflects a deeper institutional malaise, where the focus remains on punitive measures rather than rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The leadership of the GPS lacks the necessary qualifications and experience in modern correctional management, which is essential for transforming the service into a functional component of the national security architecture. According to experts like Andrew Coyle, author of “Managing Prisons in a Time of Change” (2002), effective prison management requires a shift towards correctional models that prioritize rehabilitation and the humane treatment of inmates. The failure of the Gambia Prison Service to implement such models not only undermine the efficacy of its operations but also undercuts the broader goals of correctional modernization and human rights compliance. By failing to embrace rehabilitative models that prioritize restorative justice and therapeutic interventions, the Gambia Prison Service neglects essential correctional management principles that could mitigate recidivism and facilitate the successful reintegration of offenders into society. This oversight not only perpetuates a penological environment reliant on punitive measures but also deviates from best practices in correctional theory, such as the Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) model, which emphasizes tailoring interventions to the specific risks and needs of inmates to optimize rehabilitation outcomes.
However, it is important to note that the GPS has indeed seen a few bright spots since the change of government, especially in terms of eliminating the widespread torture that was once commonplace during the Jammeh era. While torture has thankfully been removed from the daily menu, the GPS still has its hands full managing other pressing issues, such as chronic overcrowding and insufficient facilities. In an ironic twist, prisoners now have the luxury of lodging complaints about overcrowding rather than enduring the torturous practices of the past. This shift represents a significant improvement, transforming complaints from a matter of life-threatening concern into a bureaucratic process more similar to filing a complaint about a broken vending machine. While the removal of torture is certainly a commendable step forward, it’s important to recognize that the GPS’s progress should not be mistaken for a comprehensive overhaul. Instead, it highlights a partial victory in a broader struggle. The GPS is no longer the punitive dungeon of yesteryears, but its current state still reflects a system grappling with fundamental issues that remain unresolved. So, while inmates might now have the opportunity to grumble about their overcrowded conditions in a more civilized manner, the overall situation remains a poignant reminder of the long journey ahead. If progress were measured by the degree to which prisoners can now complain about their conditions, the GPS would be a case study in how to go from medieval torture to modern bureaucracy—one complaint form at a time.
Gambia Fire and Rescue Services (GFRS)
The Gambia Fire and Rescue Service is another critical component of national security that is severely underfunded and unprepared to handle emergencies. The service’s outdated equipment and lack of modern training significantly hamper its ability to respond to disasters, whether natural or man-made. The absence of a comprehensive disaster management strategy means that when crises occur, the service is often overwhelmed and unable to provide effective assistance. This failure not only puts lives and property at risk but also erodes public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens. William L. Waugh Jr., a leading expert on emergency management and professor at Georgia State University, discusses in his book, “Living with Hazards, Dealing with Disasters” (2000), the critical importance of a well-trained and well-equipped emergency response system. Waugh’s analysis highlights the consequences of inadequate investment in emergency services, a vulnerability that is starkly evident in The Gambia’s Fire and Rescue Service. Despite the significant challenges posed by chronic underfunding, GFRS have consistently demonstrated an ability to achieve remarkable outcomes with limited resources. Even with a shoestring budget, the GFRS has managed to perform exceptionally well, particularly when compared to other security agencies in the country. This performance reflects the dedication and professionalism of its officers, who often put their lives on the line despite receiving only modest compensation. The service’s ability to maintain operational effectiveness in the face of financial constraints underscores the importance of efficiency and resourcefulness in disaster and risk management.
Economically speaking, the GFRS operates under severe budgetary limitations, yet it maximizes its resources through prudent management and strategic prioritization of tasks. The service’s approach can be likened to the concept of “doing more with less,” a principle that is often emphasized in public sector management, particularly in resource-constrained environments. By focusing on essential training, maintaining equipment as best as possible, and fostering a strong sense of duty among its officers, the GFRS has managed to provide critical emergency services to the Gambian public. This level of efficiency is rare and commendable, especially within a national context where other agencies struggle to deliver even basic services despite having more resources.
On the same token, the GFRS is one of the least corrupt institutions within the Gambian security apparatus. Corruption, which often plagues other sectors, is notably less prevalent, if not virtually nonexistent, in the GFRS. This relative integrity has allowed the service to ensure that resources, no matter how limited, are utilized effectively for their intended purpose. The officers’ commitment to their duty, even in the face of personal risk and low pay, reflects a strong institutional culture of service and sacrifice. In the field of disaster and risk management, this commitment is crucial, as it ensures that the GFRS can respond swiftly and effectively to emergencies, thereby minimizing the impact of disasters on the Gambian population.
The GFRS’s ability to operate under such constraints highlights the importance of leadership, morale, and a clear sense of mission in disaster response organizations. While financial resources are essential, the GFRS’s experience demonstrates that with strong leadership and a dedicated workforce, even severely underfunded organizations can achieve significant results. This resilience and effectiveness under pressure make the GFRS a critical asset in The Gambia’s national security strategy, particularly as the country faces increasing risks from natural disasters and other emergencies.
The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)
The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) is another key institution in The Gambia’s security architecture that is failing to meet its mandate. The agency is severely hampered by a lack of human capital, with officers who are poorly trained and lack formal education. This inadequacy is compounded by the agency’s inability to coordinate effectively with international bodies, a critical requirement given the transnational nature of drug trafficking. The NDLEA’s struggles are emblematic of broader issues within The Gambia’s security sector, where insufficient training and outdated practices severely limit the effectiveness of operations. Michael Kenney, a professor of international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, addresses these challenges in his work, “The International Drug Trade: The Politics of Regulation” (2015). Kenney’s analysis underscores the necessity of intelligence-led policing and international cooperation in combating drug trafficking—areas where the NDLEA is clearly deficient. The agency’s failure to adapt to modern enforcement strategies poses a significant threat to national security, as drug trafficking not only fuels crime but also destabilizes communities and undermines the rule of law. An illustrative example of the NDLEA’s operational deficiencies can be seen in its handling of a recent raid on the compound of former Nominated National Assembly member Ya Kumba Jaiteh. During this operation, officers were involved in a regrettable display of incompetence, where a simple raid on a modest cannabis stash resulted in significant setbacks. The officers, who might have seemed more adept at organizing a chaotic scene than executing a coordinated operation, ended up with injuries that could have been avoided with basic training. Their ordeal underscores a troubling reality: the NDLEA’s current approach to drug enforcement is so flawed that even a straightforward operation becomes a source of considerable disruption and embarrassment.
The aftermath of the raid highlights the systemic failures within the NDLEA. Despite the officers’ injuries and the evident mishandling of the operation, there was no subsequent legal action against the alleged perpetrators, nor was there any restitution for the wounded officers. This lapse illustrates a broader problem within the agency: an inability to secure justice or support for its personnel, reflecting a systemic issue of inefficiency and lack of accountability. The situation was further complicated by the political dynamics at play, as the UDP cyber brigade’s intervention and the subsequent withdrawal of government support from the case revealed the extent to which political considerations can compromise enforcement efforts.
The real tragedy here is not just the physical harm suffered by the officers or the failure to prosecute those involved but the broader implication of operating within a dysfunctional system. The NDLEA’s struggles embody a systemic flaw where the efforts to combat drug trafficking are undermined by ineptitude and political interference. Being a narcotic officer in this environment is perilous, not merely due to the physical risks but also due to the disheartening realization that serious drug enforcement is mired in bureaucratic inefficiency and political manipulation. The agency’s inability to address these issues reflects a fundamental problem: the NDLEA is not merely failing to meet its mandate; it is actively undermining its own role in maintaining national security.
Meet President Barrow’s Security Service Chiefs
The effectiveness of a nation’s security agencies is undeniably influenced by the leadership of their respective service chiefs. Competent leadership is paramount, as it directly impacts the ability of a security apparatus to defend a nation’s territorial integrity, maintain law and order, and safeguard national interests. Effective security leadership is rooted in a combination of education, experience, ethical conduct, and strategic foresight, which collectively enhance the ability of these agencies to respond to both internal and external threats. Conversely, a lack of effective leadership can result in weakened security responses, diminished public trust, and increased vulnerability to both internal and external threats. Here is a detailed analysis of each agency, along with an assessment of the performance of the service chiefs in their respective roles. This examination will highlight the strengths and shortcomings of their leadership and its impact on national security.
Major General Mamat O. A. Cham: Chief of Defense Staff (CDS)
Major General Mamat O. A. Cham is the current Chief of Defense Staff of the Gambia Armed Forces (GAF). His leadership is grounded in extensive military training, both domestically and internationally, where he has honed skills in leadership, strategy, and operational command. Cham’s experience in various command positions within the GAF, including his role as Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, has provided him with a deep understanding of the operational needs of the armed forces. He has played a pivotal role in key decisions related to national defense and has overseen military operations both within The Gambia and in international peacekeeping missions.
While Major General Cham’s dedication to the GAF is unquestionable, his leadership is severely constrained by his lack of formal education beyond secondary school. In today’s complex security environment, where strategic thinking and advanced military knowledge are essential, this educational gap significantly undermines his ability to lead the armed forces effectively. His limited academic background raises concerns about his capacity to manage the intricacies of modern defense strategies, thereby leaving the GAF ill-prepared to address contemporary security challenges. It is worth mentioning that Cham has surpassed the mandatory retirement age. His continued service is primarily due to President Barrow’s paranoia, fearing that younger army officers—who possess the necessary training and educational credentials—might not be as pliable to his demands. Under Cham’s leadership, the GAF has been significantly diminished in its role and capabilities, with the primary functions of the military being usurped by the ongoing presence of ECOWAS forces. This situation begs the question: why is national security being outsourced to foreign contingents when The Gambia has an army? The reliance on external forces not only undermines the sovereignty of the state but also casts doubt on the effectiveness and purpose of the national military under its current leadership
Seedy Mutarr Touray: Inspector General of Police (IGP)
Seedy Mutarr Touray currently serves as the Inspector General of Police (IGP) for the Gambia Police Force (GPF). Despite his years of service and deep operational knowledge, particularly within the Immigration Department, Touray’s transition to leading the Police Force has been less than seamless. His extensive background in immigration does not align well with the multifaceted demands of policing, which require a deep understanding of law enforcement, public safety, and criminal justice. This mismatch is further highlighted by the fact that even within the Police Force, the current Public Relations Officer possesses a higher level of education than Touray, underscoring a significant disparity in qualifications within the leadership structure. Touray’s appointment appears to be more politically motivated than merit-based, reflecting a broader trend in President Barrow’s administration, where political appointees are often used as instruments to serve specific agendas rather than being chosen for their competence and leadership ability.
Like Major General Cham, IGP Touray’s lack of post-secondary education is a critical shortcoming. The role of a modern police chief requires not only experience but also a thorough understanding of criminal justice, forensic science, and international law enforcement standards—areas where formal education is indispensable. Touray’s educational deficiencies, coupled with the systemic operational challenges within the GPF, severely hamper the force’s ability to effectively maintain law and order, which is essential for national security.
Since assuming office, Touray’s leadership has been about as effective as a leaky bucket in a rainstorm. His tenure has been marked by a series of missteps, the most egregious of which is the recent round of promotions within the force. In a stunning display of favoritism, competent and deserving officers were sidelined, while those with questionable qualifications were elevated. The very individuals whose families fought for regime change were overlooked, while those connected to former regime loyalists found themselves promoted. A prime example is Momodou Sabally’s sister, Gass Sabally, who was promoted despite lacking merit, seemingly due to Sabally’s close ties to those in power.
Instead of appointing political puppets to key positions, President Barrow would do well to draw from the pool of educated, young, and experienced professionals who are abundantly available in the country. These individuals are better equipped to handle the complexities of modern law enforcement, which is crucial for maintaining law and order. Under Seedy Touray’s leadership, the Gambia Police Force is unlikely to rise to the challenges of modern policing, leaving the nation vulnerable to a range of security threats.
It is high time that President Barrow reconsiders Seedy Touray’s role within the government. Rather than continuing in a position for which he is ill-suited, Touray should be redeployed to a sector more aligned with his experience, such as immigration, where his skills might be more effectively utilized. In his place, a new leader should be appointed—someone with advanced academic qualifications in national security and a proven track record in modern policing. Such a figure would be far better positioned to reform the GPF and ensure that it meets the demands of contemporary law enforcement, ultimately enhancing the safety and security of the nation
Ebrima Mboob: Director General of GID
Ebrima Mboob currently serves as the Director General of the Gambia Immigration Department (GID). With extensive experience in immigration management, Mboob has held various positions within the GID, where he has been involved in key aspects of border security, immigration law, and the administration of immigration policies. His academic background includes qualifications in business administration and security studies, which have provided him with a solid foundation for managing the complexities of immigration control and border security.
Despite his efforts to modernize the department and improve its efficiency, the GID remains plagued by persistent corruption and operational challenges. The lack of a strong stance against corruption within the government has further exacerbated these issues, leading to what is often regarded as one of the worst periods for the GID. While Mboob has initiated some reforms, the broader environment of lax anti-corruption measures continues to hinder significant progress within the department. GID is today ever before rated as the most corrupt public sector institution in the Gambia.
Ansumana Manneh: Director General of GPS)
Ansumana Manneh holds the position of Director General of the Gambia Prison Service (GPS) at the time of preparing this paper . With a long career in prison administration, Manneh has accumulated substantial experience in managing prison facilities and overseeing inmate rehabilitation programs. His expertise extends to addressing critical issues such as overcrowding and the poor living conditions that have plagued the prison system in The Gambia for years.
Manneh has also received professional training in corrections management, human rights, and inmate rehabilitation, equipping him with the necessary skills to attempt reforms within the GPS. Under his leadership, several initiatives aimed at improving prison conditions and ensuring adherence to human rights standards have been introduced. However, these efforts have been met with mixed results, as the structural and resource-related challenges within the GPS are deeply entrenched.
Despite his experience and commitment to reform, Manneh’s leadership is constrained by systemic issues that persist within the prison system. Overcrowding, inadequate facilities, and insufficient resources continue to undermine the effectiveness of the GPS, limiting the impact of the reforms that have been implemented. Furthermore, the broader context of governance in The Gambia, which has often been characterized by a lack of strong institutional support, has further complicated efforts to bring about meaningful change within the prison service.
Like many of his predecessors, Manneh’s educational qualifications are limited to secondary school. However, what he lacks in academic credentials has been somewhat offset by his innovative thinking—an attribute notably absent in the leadership of the GPS in previous years. Under Manneh’s guidance, the GPS has witnessed a few noteworthy reforms. The abolition of torture, once a horrific standard practice, is a significant advancement. Furthermore, partnerships with both local and international bodies have been established, aiming to enhance the operational quality and management of the prison system. These changes align with some of the fundamental principles of contemporary penology, particularly the focus on human rights and the humane treatment of inmates.
Yet, when evaluated against modern international correctional standards, Manneh’s reforms appear rather modest. While eliminating torture is a commendable step forward, it represents just a fraction of the comprehensive overhaul needed to transform the GPS into a truly modern correctional facility. Persistent issues, such as extreme overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure, remain inadequately addressed. The incremental nature of these reforms underscores a broader issue: substantial progress remains elusive due to persistent systemic problems.
In recent years, the efforts of public figures such as former prisoner and celebrity Bob Keita have brought renewed attention to the dire conditions within The Gambia’s prison system. Keita and others have galvanized public awareness and advocacy, emphasizing the critical need to support and reform public institutions like the GPS. Their activism underscores the growing recognition among Gambians of the necessity to address the deficiencies within the prison system and advocate for more comprehensive reforms.
The involvement of such high-profile figures in raising awareness about the state of the prison system reflects a broader societal push towards demanding accountability and improvements in public institutions. However, despite these efforts, the fundamental issues within the GPS persist, suggesting that significant challenges remain in achieving the level of reform required to align with international standards of correctional facility management. The situation calls for a more robust and sustained commitment to addressing both the systemic issues and the operational shortcomings that continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Gambia Prison Service.
Ousman Sowe: Director General of SIS
Ousman Sowe currently serves as the Director General of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), bringing with him a considerable background in intelligence and security. His career within the intelligence community, combined with his academic credentials in security studies and intelligence, positions him as a leader ostensibly well-suited to steer the agency through necessary reforms. However, despite these qualifications, Sowe’s leadership has been fraught with issues that suggest he may be fundamentally unsuited to effect the transformative change the SIS requires.
Philosophically, Sowe’s leadership might be likened to the concept of the “Philosopher King” as envisioned by Plato—an individual whose knowledge and wisdom should, in theory, make him an ideal ruler. However, in practice, his tenure reflects the limitations of this ideal when confronted with the practical demands of governance. The grand visions of reform and modernization, while intellectually sound, have struggled to take root in the agency’s day-to-day operations. This situation highlights the perennial tension between theoretical knowledge and practical governance, where the ideals of leadership, though well-intentioned, often falter in the face of entrenched institutional challenges. As a result, Sowe’s leadership underscores the difficulties inherent in bridging the gap between academic theory and the pragmatic requirements of effective intelligence management.
Sowe’s longstanding association with the Jammeh regime places a heavy burden on his tenure. During Jammeh’s rule, the intelligence apparatus was deeply implicated in numerous human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and widespread repression. Sowe’s involvement, whether direct or indirect, in this system undermines his credibility and hampers his ability to lead a meaningful departure from the past. While he may possess the technical skills and theoretical knowledge necessary for his role, his history taints his leadership, making it difficult to inspire confidence both within the SIS and among the broader Gambian public.
While Ousman Sowe possesses the credentials and experience one might expect of a leader in his position, these qualities have not translated into effective leadership of the SIS. His past associations, lackluster approach to reform, and reluctance to make the necessary bold changes leave the agency mired in the very problems it needs to overcome. As a result, true reform within the SIS seems unlikely to take shape under his leadership, and the agency remains adrift, unable to fulfill its vital role in safeguarding the nation’s security.
One might wonder why President Barrow continues to recycle former Jammeh apologists into key positions within his administration, despite the glaring contradictions this creates. Perhaps, in his quest for continuity, Barrow sees value in keeping the old guard close, under the mistaken belief that experience, even tainted, is preferable to untested hands. Or perhaps, he simply enjoys the irony of turning Jammeh’s former enforcers into the keepers of his own regime. If this trend continues, it would only be fitting to roll out the red carpet for Jammeh himself to return as the national security adviser, given how comfortably his former underlings are thriving under Barrow’s leadership. After all, why stop at recycling when you can bring back the original source of all things that plagued the nation?
Sang C. Ndow : Chief Fire Officer of GNFRS
Sang C. Ndow is the Chief Fire Officer of the Gambia National Fire and Rescue Service (GNFRS). With a career spent in the fire service, Ndow has gained extensive experience in fire management, emergency response, and disaster preparedness. His rise through the ranks has provided him with a detailed understanding of the operational challenges faced by the GNFRS. Ndow has undergone specialized training in fire safety, emergency management, and leadership, equipping him with the necessary skills to effectively lead the GNFRS. As Chief Fire Officer, he has been a vocal advocate for improving resources and training for the fire service, recognizing the critical need for better equipment and infrastructure. His qualifications and experience make him well-suited to address the challenges facing the GNFRS, particularly in enhancing emergency response capabilities.
Unlike some of his counterparts, Ndow has demonstrated effectiveness in his role; however, his agency has historically been given less priority dating back to the regimes of Jawara and Jammeh, and this trend has continued under Barrow. In Western countries, firefighters are held in high regard as the first line of defense in emergencies, but in The Gambia, the Fire and Rescue Services have been consistently underfunded and undervalued. Despite these challenges, Ndow has managed to maintain some level of operational capability within the department, though the lack of resources and political will to prioritize the agency severely hampers its effectiveness. The continued neglect of this critical service leaves The Gambia vulnerable to disasters that could otherwise be mitigated with a well-supported and equipped fire service.
Demba Ceesay: Director General of DLEAG
Demba Ceesay, the newly appointed Director General of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG), brings a nuanced perspective to this pivotal role. His prior position as administrative director within the agency provided him with an intimate understanding of its internal dynamics and challenges. Ceesay’s leadership thus far has been characterized by an intention to revitalize the agency, aiming to modernize its operations and enhance its efficacy in combating drug trafficking and abuse.
Despite his commitment to reform, Ceesay faces significant hurdles. The DLEAG has long been beleaguered by entrenched issues such as corruption, limited resources, and insufficient training for its staff. These persistent problems have severely constrained the agency’s ability to effectively address the complexities of drug enforcement in an increasingly sophisticated and globalized drug trade.
In The Gambia, where drug trafficking routes intersect with local markets and drug abuse rates are rising, Ceesay’s efforts are crucial but fraught with challenges. His ability to lead the DLEAG through this critical period will be tested by the agency’s need for comprehensive reform and a more strategic approach to both domestic and transnational drug issues. The efficacy of his leadership will ultimately determine the agency’s capacity to address the pressing drug-related challenges facing the country and restore its operational integrity. Thus, assessing the impact of his leadership will require a more extended period to observe changes in the agency’s operational efficiency, its success in tackling drug trafficking, and improvements in its resource management and personnel capabilities.
The complexities of the drug trade, including its transnational dimensions and the sophistication of trafficking networks, will play a crucial role in determining the agency’s ability to respond effectively under Ceesay’s direction. Thus, while initial efforts and intentions are noteworthy, a comprehensive evaluation of Ceesay’s tenure necessitates a longer-term perspective to accurately gauge the impact of his reforms and leadership.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institutions or organizations. The author takes full responsibility for the opinions and analysis presented herein. The author holds several academic degrees, including an undergraduate degree in English literature and literary theory.
